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A majority—almost 99 per cent—of African miners live in
mine hostels- These are single-sex quarters located close to
mine shafts/ and they service the labour needs of individual
mines. In the past they have also been called compounds/ to
refer to the time when the mine quarters were basic and primitive
facilities, with large rooms in some instances accommodating up
to 90 miners in their public space, no private ablution, toilet
facilities, electricity, and minimal, modest service provi-
sion.! corporate embarrassment about compound life, brought
about in part by a number of academic studies published in the
1970s2, motivated the mining houses to reform and improve the
mine residence, and substantial sums of money were pumped into
upgrading, and, as Merle Lipton put it, ameliorating the
conditions of mine life.3 Room size and propinquity were
reduced, private ablution and toilet facilities provided,
electricity was supplied, and recreation and bar facilities
became part of the hostel environment. The compounds were
modernised quite considerably in the 1970s, and part of the
modernisation was a change also in nomenclature; they became
known as hostels, a term denoting mass residence, but free of
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more or less guaranteed a physically competent work force.5
It is also true that/ since it was first put in place
almost a century ago/ the compound has been a most important
device by which the mine labour force has been sheltered from
politics. During the 1980s, as this chapter will show/ the
mine labour force was irreversibly incorporated into politics,
and took a leading role in the politics of the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest union federation in
the nation today. But whether it was with the 1920 and 1946
black miners1 strikes, the mine disturbances of the 1970s, and
even the 1980s/ when the unionization of the African labour
force took place, entry and access to compounds, whether by
trade unionists or political activists, was regulated strictly
by management. For the better part of its history, it was
management's gatekeeping the compounds that insulated the miners
from a developing political culture of resistance in the town-
ships of South Africa. When management lost control over access
to compounds in the 1980s, albeit temporarily/ the labour force
burst forth with surprising militancy.
Along similiar lines, disturbances involving African miners
invited security measures which turned the hostels into jails,
and by locking workers in, potential strike action could easily
be broken. T. Dunbar Moodie documented in the case of the 1946
African miners' strike the facility of the compound to serve also
as a jail, which, combined with security pressure, broke that
3
The Group with the Flag
Chapter Seven
particular strike.6 During an earlier case, Frederick A.
Johnstone tells the story of how during the 1920 black miners'
strike, 9 000 African miners in four mines refused to work, and
" .. • in response to this, the army was called in, and it
surrounded and entered the compounds, and the Director of Native
Labour ... gave the striking workers the choice of returning to
work or being arrested."? Again, in later periods, the physical
and political architecture of the compound made possible its
transformation into an instrument of security and repression,
which was precisely part of the purpose behind its construction
and, later, modification.8
In this chapter, the functions of the mine hostels are
considered against a background where and when managerial control
over hostels could no longer be taken for granted. The circum-
stances were special and unusual—the three week long black
miners1 strike of August 1987—and ought not to be seen as a
typical pattern of class conflict on the mines. But it is
precisely under circumstances where class conflict is greatest
that the contradictions of social institutions are best highligh-
ted, that the weaknesses of management and the strengths of
workers are illustrated, and where the inability of social
institutions like the hostel to reproduce a labour repressive
order is made very clear for all/ especially those subject to
its discipline, to see. In other words, it is during an
unusual event such as a strike that the capacities of actors, be
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they management or workers, to maintain or subvert a histori-
cally created order, are mostly clearly demonstrated.
The account that follows is based on sources which cover two
large mines, one in the West Rand and another in the Far West
Rand. Material on events at a large Orange Free state mine will
also be used occasionally. The author, unfortunately, is not
at liberty to reveal the identity of the mines, for fear that by
doing so informants will be compromised and placed at risk.
Therefore, in the narrative, the mines are referred to as West
Rand mine, Far West Rand mine and Orange Free State mine.
Furthermore, and for the same reason, the identity of the major
sources used to describe particular events that occurred at the
mine hostels cannot be revealed. Wherever possible/ publicly
available sources are used, and are cited as evidence. But the
bulk of the evidence cannot, unfortunately/ be acknowledged at
this time. The author seeks to assure the reader of the faithful
use of these sources, which are of undoubted veracity.
New Rules Under Strike Conditions
Normally, mine hostels are run and administered by mine
management. A hostel staff would be responsible for the prepara-
tion and serving of food, the physical maintenance of facili-
ties, and the provision of essential services. Again, under
normal circumstances, the delivery of these services underwrites
managerial authority to call workers to shift, en masse. It is
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as if in exchange for the provision of certain essential domestic
services management feels entitled to intervene in the domestic
lives of black miners for work-related reasons/ such as collec-
tively rousing and processing the workers to a shift of work
underground.
While management in the past controlled hostels/ the
control was never total, and since the unionization of the black
work force in the 1980s, that control has become seriously
attenuated. For it is also true that in as much as the hostel
can be an instrument of managerial authority, it can also,
under very specific circumstances, become an instrument of union
authority. During a strike situation/ when the union leadership
desires and wishes to enforce maximum abstention from work, the
hostel is a central device by which strike action can be policed
and enforced. To control the hostel is to have in hand the power
to enforce a strike action.
During the first week of the strike (August 7-14, 1987)/ it
was management1s intelligence that the union desired to prolong
the strike by sending workers home, that they would be recalled
once, it was hoped, the Chamber of Mines met the union's
demands, and that strike committees will stay behind in hostels
to ensure that workers who do not go home do not go to work
either.9 Management was well aware of the critical role the
hostels would play in the strike. Various members of the NUM
leadership gave advanced warning about their intention to seize
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control of the hostels/ and alerted management of their strategy
to subvert hostel governance.10
At the time, the union sought maximum access to the
hostels, precisely because by doing so it could through its
strike committee (made up of mine level union members), enforce
the strike action, and impair management's capacity to break the
strike. The union thus insisted that there be no restriction on
freedom of movement, that union officials be allowed normal
rights of access, and that mine security personnel be allowed
access to hostels only when accompanied by union officials. The
union further made the rather odd request, that "South African
Police or security forces will not be invited on to mine premises
without prior consultation with and the consent of the union head
office"!!/ as if the union would ever consent to the presence of
the South African Police or security forces on mine property !
But the point nevertheless was that in order to wage a successful
strike, it was to the union's advantage to gain access and
eventually control the hostels.
During the course of the strike, at a number of mine major
mines, the union essentially controlled the hostels for the
strike's duration/ though the control was uneven, erratic, and
not always very successful. In the example of a West Rand mine,
the union's strike committee controlled entry and exit into
hostels (of everyone save hostel residents), the provision of
food to residents, and subverted management's capacity to call
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the shift and to get workers underground. As the strike
proceeded it became the tacit understanding of management and
workers on the mine level that the rules governing the hostel
during a strike situation had changed. On a day to day level
management behaved as if the union controlled the hostel, and
did very little to alter the new rules of hostel governance.
The shift in governance can be illustrated by events at the
West Rand mine. At first/ after a meeting held between the NUM
branch and mine management/ it was agreed that the branch
committee may control the strike and that management will still
manage the hostels. But the union took over the kitchens and
canteens, began to refuse management entry to the hostels (when
it was possible to enforce it), only allowed service and repair
workers entry under the supervision of union members, and
gatekept the hostel by issuing yellow tickets to workers who had
permission to leave and enter. Four days after it was agreed
that management will still manage the hostels the hostel manager
was told that his responsibility ends at the entrance of the
hostel, that all responsibility for the kitchen lay with them,
and not with him.
The hostel manager did little to regain control over the
kitchens. His concern was not 30 much that workers would be
badly fed (which they presumably were, as the union was hardly
skilled to produce and serve such large quantities of food,
though it tried unsuccessfully at times), but that equipment and
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kitchen facilities would be damaged. He was therefore always
happy to note that the union kept the kitchens clean/ that
equipment was fully functional, and when they were not, went to
great lengths to have these repaired. The strike committee, and
the branch committee of the union, were not capable of fully
servicing the hostels, and regularly turned to the hostel
manager for assistance. For example, after a meeting between
the parties, and after the strike committee made a series of
requests, the hostel manager agreed to supply the committee with
meal tickets, toilet cleaning materials, and electrical globes.
He also promised to assist with garbage removal, with spillages
in the kitchen and said he would ask the electricians to attend
to electrical outlet and plug problems. He agreed with the
strike committee's request that the electricians would only gain
entry to the hostel if accompanied by a strike committee member.
In return for these, the hostel manager requested the strike
committee to hand over all disciplinary cases. While he hardly
loved the strike committee, and while he was constantly (and
rudely) reminded to remain in the office and not to go into the
hostel at all, there nevertheless was a unspoken agreement about
spheres of authority; the strike and union branch committees ran
the hostel, albeit at times with hostel management's assistance,
and though the hostel manager complained about his lost and
subverted authority, he did very little to regain it during the
strike.12
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Kitchens, Food/ and Other Domestic Matters
It was noted earlier that one of the primary functions
of the hostel, under normal conditions, is to mass feed the
work force. It is one of the many characteristics of the hostel
that is reason for its being regarded a 'total institution'/
much like a prison or mental institution.13 Like the prison or
mental institution, the residents of the hostel are fed, and do
not feed themselves.
At the beginning of the strike, it was the union's request
to the Chamber of Mines that food provision at all member mines
continue as normal, at no additional cost to the workers
involved.14 This was in part a response to a threat, emanating
from one of the larger mine houses that workers on strike will be
charged for food consumed. As early as the first week of July,
a month before the strike began, regional managers of the mine
house in question were advised that in the event of a strike to
deduct both food and accommodation charges from striking workers,
and that the caveat should be used to persuade workers not to go
on strike; the workers were to be told that management will
charge employees for food and accommodation if they refused to
work normally.15 The union's request for normal food provision
at no additional cost to the workers thus received little
sympathy, and the Chamber of Mines concurred with the view of
the mine house that "the employer is ... not obliged to pay him
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in cash or in kind for the period he is on strike and would be
fully entitled to recover the cost of food and accommodation
provided."16 The Chamber claimed that to charge for food was not
in law an unfair labour practice, though the use of food as a
behaviour modification device, begs many a moral question.
In the theatre of class conflict/ however, it is not
morality but partisan advantage that matters/ and the union was
not allowed to have its cake and eat it too. If it wished a
strike upon the industry, it had to take a number of penalties,
one of which was to feed the work force. The union, and its
strike committees, were hardly equipped to take on this additio-
nal burden/ and through the course of the strike there were many
complaints about the quality of food preparation and service. As
noted earlier/ the union stood to gain a great deal/ however/
by its control over the hostel. The provision of food underwrote
the union's more general authority to run the hostel/ and took
out of management's hand the power to manipulate food to its
advantage. In one instance, at the Far West Rand mine, the
same day that the strike committee and mine management formally
agreed that management still controlled the hostels, the union
took over the hostel kitchens and dining halls/ and were
clipping meal tickets. The hostel manager was extremely
displeased by the breach of verbal contract, finding upon
arrival in the kitchen two union men clipping meal tickets. He
reminded them of the morning's meeting agreement, and asked for
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their names.
The strike committee was not in the position, however, to
feed the work force with its own resources/ and had to rely on
some level of co-operation with management. Firstly, and
despite the earlier threats, the union relied on management to
supply the food, and allow its delivery to the hostels.
Secondly, since the strike committee did not have access to a
staff of cooks, the retention of services of the kitchen
personnel, which were under the control of management, was
essential* At no time during the strike did management either
prevent the delivery of food or turned the cooks away from the
hostels. The cooks, unclear about their status during the
strike, erratically catered in the hostels, but that is
another story. From the point of view of the strike committee,
if management provided the food and the kitchen staff, all it
had to do was control and police the process of food preparation
and service.
At first, with the strike young and the strikers enthusias-
tic, the strike committee kept its hand efficiently on the
kitchens. In one instance/ at the West Rand mine, a member of
management reported that all staff were on duty, that breakfast
was prepared, that the union had chased out unit prefects from
the dining halls and kitchens, and have taken over the clipping
of meal tickets. The manager returned from the kitchens, and
without alarm reported further that the feeding of the workers
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was in progress/ that the union was still in charge, and that
there were no problems- At another occasion, at the same mine,
the hostel manager was disturbed by the accumulated dirt in the
kitchens, but found everything to be in order, otherwise.
However, as the strike wore on, the capacity of the strike
committee to maintain this level of performance deteriorated.
This was as a result, mainly, of the breakdown of equipment,
in the kitchens and elsewhere, and their tardy repair, when
they were repaired. In one instance (at the Free State mine),
the computerised feeding system in one hostel broke down. In
another, at the West Rand mine, the badge reading machine, and
the kitchen computer, both part of the computerised feeding
system, would not read the workers' identification cards. At
the same mine at another time, the dishwasher broke down. Some
of these problems were recurrent, and the solution under normal
(i.e. non-strike) circumstances was constant, hands-on,
servicing. But because the strike committee wanted to strictly
control entry and exit to hostels, and insisted on accompanying
all outsiders, especially those suspected as management's spies
or otherwise untrustworthy, such as the service and repair men,
these problems were slowly attended to, and some were not
repaired at all- The observation can be more broadly illustrated
by looking at all hostel services, in addition to those of the
kitchen.
At the West Rand mine, the strike committee requested the
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union and management was scheduled to discuss the kitchen
situation. The meeting wasn't held. Management claimed that the
union representatives did not turn up for the meeting. After
another four days, NUM and management reached an agreement
regarding a solution to the boiler problem, and agreed that mine
security could now escort the engineers into the hostel. After
yet another four days (which makes it ten days after the boiler
broke down), and despite the fact that an agreement was signed
earlier, neither security nor the engineers could gain access to
the hostel. Perhaps, in this particular instance, the union
had little control (and authority) over the hostel residents,
which would explain why their agreements with management could
not easily be upheld.
At another hostel (Far West Rand mine) the dishwasher had
broken down in the kitchen, and a water pipe burst at the
changehouse (where employees change into work attire). The
strike committee requested the services of an electrician, but
the hostel manager himself wanted access to the kitchen and
changehouse to assess the situation first-hand. It was essen-
tial, he claimed, that maintenance personnel has to get into
the kitchen and changehouse. The union refused the hostel
manager and the maintenance crews access to the hostel. Instead,
the strike committee collected the electrician, took him to the
affected hostel, and presumably the problem was fixed. In
another case, the electricity went out in an entire block of
15
The Group with the Flag
Chapter Seven
rooms. No lights and no heaters were the complaint. The
electrician tried to gain access/ but it wasn't possible at the
time because there was nobody to escort him in. Later in the
day, the electrician found his union escort/ and all the
electrical problems in the hostel were subsequently repaired.
The story could easily be repeated for other service
breakdowns; because the strike committees ran the hostels/ and
maintained a strict regime of gatekeeping/ simple servicing and
repair work of physical plant and equipment were often
problematic. It was management's concern that the problems with
servicing and repair would get out of hand, leading to
permanent, and expensive, breakdown. In the end there were no
really serious problems/ except in the case of the breakdown of
the boiler, where the mine house involved wanted to take the
union to court, to sue for damages. The somewhat clumsy policing
procedures set up by the strike committees, in some hostels
simply to prevent management from undermining their control/
resulted in inefficient and deteriorating hostel governance;
understandably, the union did not initially plan to nor was it
equipped to take on hostel governance on a permanent basis.
Towards the end of the strike, hostel governance was squarely
back in the hands of management.
The hostel manager/ his staff and mine security/ whether
out of fear or grudging respect, recognized the strike commit-
tee's regime in the hostels. Of course, since everyone knew
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that the regime was temporary, and that it had to come to an end
sooner or later, such recognition does not come at a high price.
The strike committee, and the larger union network of which it
was part, were confident that they were running the hostel, but
depended on hostel management for food and other supplies, as
well as for repair and servicing work,18 The spheres of
authority drawn during the strike were thus mutually respected,
best illustrated by the following narrative. The hostel manager
requested from the strike committee some powdered milk, which
was kept in the hostel kitchens, and the committee turned it
down. The committee claimed that whites were not entitled to
rations, only blacks- They further claimed that if the hostel
manager wanted something he must ask (which he did), and even if
he was still the boss, they were running the hostel.
Subverting Managerial Authority
During the course of a normal working day at a gold mine,
three shifts of work are normally completed. These shifts are
announced or called over a public address system, collectively
rousing to work those miners assigned to a particular shift. The
first shift of the day is usually called at about 3 a.m., and it
would take anywhere between two to three hours after the shift
has been called for the miners to reach the actual working, or,
stopeface. As noted before, the fact that the miners live in
hostels located close to the mine shaft makes the process
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relatively easy/ as management has the capacity to rouse and
regiment miners to work. The hostel also allowed management to
police absenteeism (a simple survey of the hostel would establish
who is absent).
During a strike situation it is in the union's interest to
keep as many miners away from work/ and if the miners are not
sent home, to keep as many as possible also within the confines
of the hostel. In this situation the union can encourage and
forge a solidarity among striking miners/ the collective
conscience can be made to prevail/ and if necessary, the strike
committee can enforce the strike action by physically preventing
miners from going to work. Under circumstances where a universal
solidarity among miners prevails/ the strike action is very
successful/ both because it makes manifest the union's ultimate
sanction of withholding labour, and because it serves as a
prophylactic against management's counter-strategies aimed at
breaking the strike.
Not in one instance during the 1987 strike did the union
obtain universal/ voluntary abstention from work. In some
instances, the level of participation in the strike correlated
with the strength of the union at a particular mine or group of
mines; so that, for example, because the union was weakly
represented at mines affiliated with the Goldfields group,
participation in the strike action was marginal, in contrast to
Anglo American mines, where union strength and strike
18
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participation was high.19 In other instances, the most
vulnerable groups of workers in the labour market, those who
would find it difficult to obtain alternative employment/ such
as many if not all foreign workers, resisted taking part in the
strike action. And in yet other instances, for those miners who
feared losing employment, who disagreed perhaps with the union,
or who were closer to management than to the union,
participation in the strike action had attached too many costs.
Whatever the particular reason, the union could not count on a
universal solidarity, (in fact faced a declining solidarity as
the strike wore on) and as a result developed strategies to
maximise strike participation, even in the face of resistance.
One strategy was simply to physically prevent miners from
leaving the hostel or entering the shaft.20 This was used often
enough, and to great effect, but it was the union's final
sanction/ used when all else failed. (Even at the beginning of
the strike, when worker solidarity is expected to be highest,
the union was enforcing obedience; at the West Rand mine/
management reported that union men were stopping workers from
going down.)21 Management self-righteously referred to these
behaviours as intimidation, which on one level it clearly was,
but another level was simply the old sociological problem of
maintaining a collective solidarity in the face of known and
unknown, potential, defection, when the relative balance of
costs and benefits of withholding one's labour are unevenly
19
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distributed in the labour force. For the union/ it was relati-
vely costly to use the final sanction (it caused bad press,
discredited the union, but more serious was the possibility that
the union might lose sympathisers and members in the labour force
when it went beyond the threshold of tolerable coercion, without
knowing what the threshold was.) Moreover, the union lacked the
physical capacity to extensively police and to deal with every
act of deviance, so that even though the union used the final
sanction often enough, it relied more systematically on strate-
gies which were designed to subvert and hold in check manage-
ment's attempts to get workers back to work.
One such strategy was to prevent management from calling the
shift and from broadcasting its propaganda over the public
address system. During the first week of the strike, when the
level of solidarity among workers was high, the calling of the
shift and the use of the public address system for management
propaganda were non-issues for the union. Typically, the
shifts were called, but no response was forthcoming from the
striking workers. During this week, every shift was called over
the public address system in spite of the strike, and the hostel
residents were bombarded with management propaganda over the
public address system, and no one particularly was bothered by
this. At times, management propaganda—"briefs" as they are
called by management—would be replayed every 10 minutes.22
Once, however, worker solidarity began to weaken, and
20
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some of the workers began to doubt the wisdom of their action,
the divisive tactics of management took on a new meaning* and
urgency. Yesterday's innocuous propaganda becomes today's
poison; again, it is common occurrence to blame an outside
party or agency for a declining solidarity, particularly when
the behaviour of that party is in any case cause for protest.
Thus, as the strike wore on, the mine public address system
became a battleground between management and the union, and
access to the facility a major goal of both parties. At the West
Rand mine, it was during the second week of the strike that the
hostel manager reported that he sent someone to broadcast over
the public address system when he was grabbed by members of the
NUM. The manager sent a member of mine security to rescue the
person.
The union members became adamant that management had no
right to call the shift. In one case members of the union walked
into the hostel manager's office (West Rand mine) and asked him
who gave him the right to call the shift ? The union's argument
in support of its members1 behaviour was three-fold; firstly,
that the calling of the shift was tantamount to a denial of the
strike action, and thus provocative. Secondly, that if workers
were to respond to the calling of shift, most would not be fit
or ready to work. And thirdly, the union feared that workers
might indeed respond to the calling of the shift, and that one
way of coping with this was to shut the messenger up. In one
21
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the broadcast room. At yet another hostel the operator was sent
to broadcast over the PA system and was allegedly grabbed by
members of the union- Mine security was sent to go and get him
out.
Calling the shift was one cause for dispute. Another cause
was the broadcasting of management propaganda. The public
address system was used to broadcast what are known as briefs/
which would be messages from corporate head office, regional
management or mine level management/ for the workers. For
example, just before the strike began/ one of the mine houses's
head office instructed mine level management to issue a brief
which included items head office thought ought to be conveyed to
the workers, including the advice that the workers "will lose
wages", "put your jobs at risk"/ "if you strike you will not get
more wages", "if you strike, you will actually lose pay and
bonus and will also be charged for board and lodging", and that
"the national executive is not going to lose anything as a result
of any strike." Through the course of the strike, head office
regularly sent briefs via mine level management to the workers,
updating them on corporate views regarding the strike's progress.
Briefs broadcasted over the public address irritated the
union members greatly, simply because the union regarded these a
source of disinformation and counter-intelligence. The briefs
compounded the union's problem with the calling of the shift,
and simply aggravated the feelings about the public address
23
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system, and justified further its disruption. In one extreme
case, the public address system was disconnected and destroyed.
In another case, the union members were so disgruntled about the
corporate propaganda, they wanted to come up to the office and
rip the PA system out. But these were extreme examples of the
more general point; that the union and its strike committees,
backed up at times by workers, sought to counteract management's
wish to tempt workers back to work during the strike.
And, at times, the effort was successful. In numerous
cases, it was simply physically impossible to use the public
address system. On the other hand, management yielded to union
pressure and stopped calling the shift and playing the briefs.
During the second week of the strike, at the West Rand mine,
the hostel staff was told that the shift was not to be called out
any more. By the third week of the strike, however, management
had restored full control over the public address system, and
returned to the routine of calling the shift and reading the
briefs. The union's disruption of the public address system was
temporary and strike bound.
The Group With the Flag
A central social mechanism by which solidarity among workers
was promoted, and which was a demonstration of power designed to
intimidate management and keep in line workers disaffected with
the strike, was mass mobilisation. On the mines, during the
24
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strike* the marching and growing crowd, singing songs and
shouting slogans, and carrying the large NUM or COSATU flag,
were powerful symbolic demonstrations of worker power, directed
principally but not exclusively at management.
Firstly, if the crowd was meant to intimidate management,
and to remind them of worker power beyond that of the bargaining
table, it certainly succeeded in its aim, by bringing to the
fore some very powerful racial anxieties. One such anxiety was
the fear of the black mob. At the West Rand mine, in one
episode, a group of black workers, flying the NUM flag, began
to move from one hostel to another, in an attempt to promote
solidarity among striking employees, and to intimidate
management. Management sources referred to the workers always as
a mob; "mob moving to block ", "mob moves again", and so on.
Mine security was alerted/ a helicopter was brought out to
circle overhead, extra security personnel was brought in from
other hostels, and Caspirs (military vehicles designed and used
for riot control purposes by the South African Police, some of
which were purchased by mine houses for mine security purposes)
were alerted. None of the heavy armour was used, nor were they
at all necessary, for the behaviour of the crowd was within
socially acceptable limits. Management videotaped and photogra-
phed the whole episode, and asked the technicians to have the
developed material the next day. The point of the exercise was
to intimidate management, which it did. The tactics were good;
25
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move around in a large and growing group/ sing and wave the
flag, and management brings out all the security hardware.
The symbolic power of the group is also illustrated by the
somewhat mystical and almost personalised qualities granted to
groups of blacks by management. In one case/ a group of black
workers, (and not a very large group/ about 150 workers)/ were
seen to be marching to the main gate of the hostel. "Mob tried
to close roller shutter door", "pushed one aside to prevent mob
closing the door", "mob unhappy", was management's response. In
another case, after an afternoon of mass mobilisation, the
hostel manager reported that "the singing mob have disappeared
and gone to sleep." The group with the flag, rallying the
masses, is almost Kafkaesque; "The group with the flag," was one
report/
on their way to the main gate, began to grow in
strength. The group, which now seems much bigger and
noisier than on 10 August, still on its way to the
main gate. A second group seems to be following the
first. This is not the same group as the group with
the flag. There is another group at the gate—about
300 people. This is the group with the flag. The
group moved into the hostel. The group stopped at the
church and appeared to be having a meeting. The group
with the flag continued towards the main gate, singing
heartily.
Secondly, a further function of mass mobilisation was to
attain good attendance for union meetings, and to deal with the
so-called free rider problem. In the sociological literature,
the free rider problem is described as the situation where
individuals do not participate in the collective effort but
26
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benefit from its consequences/ literally to take a free ride off
the efforts of others.23 Taken to the extreme/ if every
individual in a group was to be a free rider, if everyone was to
believe that others would do the work/ there would be no
collective action. In the face of this; individuals
participating in a group action will always be inclined to
develop a device which can minimise the free rider problem, by
incorporate as many participants as possible in the collective
behaviour- Mass mobilisation thus serves as a form of moral
persuasion.24
Often, just before meetings were to be held, groups of
workers would go from hostel to hostel/ singing and with flag
flying/ collecting more and more workers on their way. Under
the circumstances, the power of the disapproving.could not be
resisted, and any free rider would be morally dragged along to
the frequently held meetings. In an extreme example where the
NUM flag itself acquired magical qualities, management reported
that "NUM flag with about 20-50 people left the main gate—went
down into the hostel on a recruiting spree. The NUM
representative called the people from all sides and they are all
joining the group. There was definitely a meeting in the area,"
Policing the Strike
In the final analysis, the real power of the union and
strike committee was their capacity to directly control the
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behaviour of workers resident in hostels/ and ultimately to mete
out punishment of one sort of another for the infringement of
formal and implicit rules, put in place during the strike. From
the very beginning of the strike, union members policed the
behaviour of non-union members, and those who were inclined to
cross the picket line. Workers who wanted to go to work, were
physically prevented from doing so. In one case, a sizeable
group of (mostly) Mozambicans wanted to go to work; they were
turned back by union members at the hostel gates, the waiting
place, and at the crush. Mine security complained that union
men stopped workers from going down.25
The policing of the strike/ as the above suggests, took
place in a number of ways. The most important strategy was to
regulate entry and exit to the hostels. In an earlier section I
discussed in some detail how the control over entry and exit (or
gatekeeping) affected service delivery and hostel maintenance.
This involved keeping outsiders (usually management and its
representatives) out, and insiders in. Outsiders had to get the
permission of the strike committee or union to enter the hostel,
and if permission was forthcoming, would be escorted into and
out of the hostel. Throughout the strike, all outsiders, be
they hostel management staff, mine security/ service personnel,
even the people who delivered food and other goods to the hostel,
were screened and escorted through the hostel. The strike
committee was greatly upset when outsiders nevertheless got into
28
Our Precious Metal
Wilmot G. James
the hostel without their permission/ as in the case when 2
members of mine security were found roaming in a West Rand mine
hostel. Members of the strike committee held the security men in
the union's office, and handed them over to management with the
threat that a grievance would be lodged.
The control over the movement of hostel residents, which
was the other side of gatekeeping the hostels, was not anywhere
as straightforward as keeping outsiders out. The device used,
in the first place, to keep track of who belonged to which
hostel, and who were outsiders and who were not/ was to issue
yellow tickets to anyone who left the hostel. The holder of the
ticket could easily return to the hostel; those who had no
ticket but desired entry had to explain themselves, and often
were subjected to a body search. Whether or not this system
actually worked day in and day out is not clear from the evi-
dence, and one could indeed wonder aloud about the extent to
which such policing of movement was not cause of major traffic
congestion in the hostels. What is clear is that by itself the
yellow ticket system was not enough of a device to police
movement, and had to be supplemented by additional measures.
The problem was one of scale and too many exits and entran-
ces to monitor. To police all of these, efficiently/ required
a personnel the union either could or would not supply. It was
never the union's business during the normal course of industrial
life to police hostels, and while of its members easily acquired
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the art/ they were not schooled nor had the will to play tough
policeman with their comrades.
One way of coping with the scale of policing was simply to
reduce the number of possible entrances and exits to and from
hostels.26 At the West Rand mine, the union tried to reduce the
number of entrances by locking the gates- For the union,
keeping the gates locked was a critical part of its regime, as
illustrated by the following two incidents. In the one, a
member of the strike committee found a previously locked gate
unlocked, and asked mine security to lock it. Apparently, the
union member was upset about the unlocked gate, and concerned
about the fate of the unauthorised people within the hostel.
Management claimed that no one was available to lock the gate,
whereupon the strike committee member took it upon himself to go
to the hostel, fetched a device and locked the gate. At another
occasion a member of the union found a gate unlocked, and used
wire to barricade it. He returned an hour later to find it
broken open once again, wired it up and reported the incident to
the chairman of the strike committee.
Of course, the locking of the gates did not go unchallenged
by management, who considered these contrary to mine policy and
practice. On this basis many a gate was unlocked by mine
security; at one hostel (West Rand mine), for example, members
of management claimed that union members had locked the gate with
two locks and a chain. These were immediately removed by the
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But the main area of control was the hostel, and on the
rare occasion recourse to the final sanction was used to disci-
pline the work force. With regards to unwelcome guests in the
hostels/ some were readily thrown out; "NUM apprehended a ...
worker in the hostel ... and then chased him out of the hostel."
At another occasion, "strike committee brought three trespassers
into the office, informed me and kicked them out of the hostel."
There were rumours of alleged physical assault/ as in one
reported incident when "seven union shaft stewards assaulted a
person in front of the gate, below the administration offices."
In another case, a man was found "tied by the wrists with wire,
and sitting on a bench between 3 union members at the main gate."
How widespread these activities were is not clear from the
available evidence, nor is the culpability of the union in any
of these a straightforward matter.2"7 In many cases of physical
assault/ individual workers took it upon themselves to mete out
punishment; in other cases, the indifference of the union to
acts of physical violence could perhaps be interpreted as license
to proceed with behaviours the union could not defend publicly,
but from which it did not decisively distance itself.
And it would indeed be false to suggest that the union
promoted unrestrained violence/ as is sometimes alleged. At the
Far West mine/ were it not for the union's intervention/ the
hostel manager could have lost his life. He reported to security
that (unknown) individuals wanted to take him out of his office
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to kill him/ but that members of the union saved him. When it
came to other forms of violence, the union also sought justice
rather than partisan advantage and co-operated with mine security
and the South African Police in a number of cases. In one case,
three men were arrested by members of the strike committee at one
hostel for raping a black woman. The committee handed the men
over to mine security, who passed them on the South African
Police. In other (lesser) cases, a man was caught with dagga
(marijuana), and he appealed to the union for assistance. They
were unsympathetic: "He had asked for help from the NUM but had
been told he knew he was in the wrong, and shouldn't have tried
to bring it into the hostel." In another episode the strike
committee picked up two vagrants, and they were handed over to
the South African Police.
Co-operation with mine security and the police should not be
taken as collaboration, for the reasons suggested above, but
also because the general tone of the relationship between the
parties was hostile. And often it was petty and vindictive. in
one example, the strike committee refused members of mine
security access to the hostel's toilets/ and they had to go to
great lengths to relieve themselves. The security men told the
strike committee member "that they only wanted to go to the
toilet and he told them to go 'panzi'." "We don't know where that
is," noted the informant.
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Contested Terrain
Towards the end of August, the strike month, a great deal
of confusion reigned in the hostels. An increasing number of
workers wanted to return to work. They were encouraged by
management, but the union did not take kindly to a premature
ending of the strike. The Anglo American Corporation, the
mining house which took the lead in resolving the strike, first
used a lock-out then dismissed workers en masse at some of its
mines, in order to force the union back to the bargaining table.
In this it succeeded, for the union returned to the bargaining
table, and accepted the same wage offer it had refused at the
beginning of July. The union's lawyers protested that the mass
dismissals were an unfair labour practice, as the pretext for
the lockout was subject to dispute. Later, many of the
dismissed workers were reinstated as in an out of court
settlement between the parties.
At one of the larger Far West Rand mines, and presumably at
other mines affected by the strike, the residents were divided
into essentially two groups before the mass dismissals came into
effect. One group wanted an early return to work; having
received warning of possible mass dismissals, these workers
feared that they might lose their jobs, a fate which indeed
befell many of them. As soon as the opportunity availed itself,
these workers went underground. For example, on August 26 1987,
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having experienced an unencumbered passage to the mine shaft/
"large numbers of black workers consisting of dayshift/ night-
shift and afternoon shift/ entered the crush/ reporting for
duty," In other cases; groups of returning workers were given
security protection by management, on their way to work. in one
episode, returning workers were escorted by security and their
Casspir to the mine shaft. In another episode, workers were
escorted to the crush by a Rhino, another security vehicle.
The other group of workers, the union stalwarts, saw the
early return to work as a betrayal of a three-week long struggle.
This group tried to frustrate as best possible management's
efforts at persuading others to return to work; they tried to
prevent workers from leaving the hostel, they kept the gates
locked, the changehouses shut. But it was too late. Once the
mass dismissals came into effect/ the union lost the battle,
and in the eyes of the workforce the union's powerlessness in the
face of a corporate determination to force a resolution was
clearly manifest. The union tried hard to participate in and
monitor the pay-outs after the dismissals, but even here
corporate management refused to consider the union's proposals
regarding procedures for pay-outs.
At the hostels, the union quickly lost ground to manage-
ment.28 At the West Rand mine, a manager took back one hostel
escorted by mine security and a Casspir. At a second hostel,
the kitchens were now run by security. Mine security and six so-
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called rescue vehicles took back a third hostel.29 Hostel
residents were told over the public address system that security
had taken over, and that people were to stay in their rooms and
wait for the shift to be called. By the end of August/ the
hostel governance was back in the hands of management.
As for the workers dismissed, they were packed off home.
Those dismissed but remaining in the hostels were told that they
had to leave. In one case/ on 29 August 1987/ mine security
was asked by the hostel manager to perform a room to room search/
to determine whether the workers were to be removed from the
premises or not. Generally/ dismissed workers were thrown out of
the hostels. They were not given leave or re-engagement
certificates. Particularly targeted were the so-called "trouble-
makers"/ those presumably most active in union business- In one
case a team leader identified one of the biggest instigators
during the strike; and on the basis of this information,
security moved into the hostel to get the instigator's clothes,
whereafter he was gotten rid of too. Management went to great
lengths to ensure that those who were in the hostels were not
dismissed workers; that dismissed workers were packed off home,
with little to no chance of re-employment; and that identifiable
union activists were among those dismissed. How general these
strategies were is not clear from the available evidence. In the
instances cited here, they were used with impunity.
The hostels would never be the same institutions again.
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Despite the fact that management regained formal control over
their functioning, the mining industry entered an era where its
institutions became contested terrain. A total institution,
used by management as an instrument of control and repression in
the past, became in the era of black unionization an arena where
the competing power of workers and management played out its
logic in the institutional setting of gold mining.
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